Shareholders\u27 Rights in Short-Form Mergers: The New Deleware Formula by Curran, Catherine L.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 4 Summer 1981 Article 4
Shareholders' Rights in Short-Form Mergers: The
New Deleware Formula
Catherine L. Curran
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Catherine L. Curran, Shareholders' Rights in Short-Form Mergers: The New Deleware Formula, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 687 (1981).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol64/iss4/4
SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS IN SHORT-FORM
MERGERS: THE NEW DELAWARE FORMULA
I. INTRODUCTION
The short-form merger is a statutory procedure by which a
parent corporation can merge with its ninety percent-owned
subsidiary through a simple board resolution.1 Since neither
1. The Model Business Corporation Act is a comprehensive analysis of the busi-
ness corporation acts of all the states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Fol-
lowing is the Model Business Corporation Act proposal for the short-form merger
statute:
MERGER OF SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION
Any corporation owning at least ninety per cent of the outstanding shares
of each class of another corporation may merge such other corporation into
itself without approval by a vote of the shareholders of either corporation; Its
board of directors shall, by resolution, approve a plan of merger setting forth-
(A) The name of the subsidiary corporation and the name of the corpora-
tion owning at least ninety per cent of its shares, which is hereinafter desig-
nated as the surviving corporation.
(B) The manner and basis of converting the shares of the subsidiary cor-
poration into shares, obligations or other securities of the surviving corporation
or of any other corporation or, in whole or part, into cash or other property.
A copy of such plan of merger shall be mailed to each shareholder of record
of the subsidiary corporation.
Articles of merger shall be executed in duplicate by the surviving corpora-
tion by its president or a vice president and by its secretary or an assistant
secretary, and verified by one of its officers signing such articles, and shall set
forth:
(a) The plan of merger;
(b) The number of outstanding shares of each class of the subsidiary cor-
poration and the number of such shares of each class owned by the surviving
corporation; and
(c) The date of the mailing to shareholders of the subsidiary corporation
of a copy of the plan of merger.
On and after the thirtieth day after the mailing of a copy of the plan of
merger to shareholders of the subsidiary corporation or upon the waiver
thereof by the holders of all outstanding shares duplicate originals of the arti-
cles of merger shall be delivered to the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of
State finds that such articles conform to law, he shall, when all fees and
franchise taxes have been paid as in this Act prescribed:
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate originals the word "Filed," and the
month, day and year of the filing thereof,
(2) File one of such duplicate originals in his office, and
(3) Issue a certificate of merger to which he shall affix the other duplicate
original.
The certificate of merger, together with the duplicate original of the articles
of merger affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, shall be returned to the
surviving corporation or its representative.
2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 75 1 (1971).
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shareholder meetings nor shareholder votes are required for
authorization of the merger, the short-form procedure clearly
saves both time and money for the corporations involved. But,
what happens to the leftover ten percent of the subsidiary's
shareholders? Most state statutes simply provide for the ten
percent minority to be paid off in cash, securities, or other
consideration after a short-form merger.2 But, what if the mi-
nority does not want to be paid off?. What if the minority
wants continued participation in the merged enterprise?
While on its face the short-form merger statute appears
simple and economical, some corporate insiders have abused
the statute in recent years by using it for the sole purpose of
eliminating the minority interest by exchanging their interest
for cash.3 As a result, if the statutory requirements have been
met, the minority shareholders have had no voice in the
merger and no remedy against their own elimination.
In response to such abuses, the Delaware Supreme Court
has recently revived traditional equity concepts and applied
them to the area of mergers.' The court has focused on the
fiduciary duty the majority shareholders owe the minority
shareholders and in so doing has developed a workable and
appropriate solution. The Delaware approach involves a two-
step court inquiry: (1) an inquiry into the business purpose of
the merger; and (2) an inquiry into the "entire fairness" of the
merger transaction.5 Using this approach, courts can make the
analysis on a case-by-case basis and protect the rights of the
minority while at the same time consider the best interests of
the corporation.
New York and Delaware pioneered the law of short-form
mergers. These legislative enactments have undergone a series
of changes and refinements since the genesis of the short-form
merger concept, and court decisions in these two states have
paralleled the statutes' evolution. A review of the law as it
evolved sheds great light on the area by revealing what ini-
tially moved legislatures to enact the statute, how the original
purpose became distorted, how abuses developed and how
2. See id. at (B).
3. See text accompanying notes 44-83 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 89-120 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 110-17 infra.
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courts today are seeking to protect minorities from these
abuses.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
At common law, a sale or other disposition of all corporate
assets required the unanimous approval of the shareholders.'
However, an exception to the unanimity rule developed which
allowed a majority of shareholders to authorize major transac-
tions when the enterprise was experiencing financial difficul-
ties, and when the transaction was calculated to meet the
crisis.7
As corporations grew in economic power and political in-
fluence, they demanded of the law more flexibility than the
unanimity rule could provide." Stubborn minorities could no
longer be permitted to frustrate major transactions until
financial difficulties permitted the majority to act. In response
to this problem, every state legislature eventually enacted
statutes to permit the majority (usually a two-thirds majority)
of each class of shareholders to authorize major transactions
involving corporate assets, including consolidations and
mergers.9
6. Des Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Ins. Co., 6 F.2d 228 (Minn. 1925);
American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 F. 896 (6th Cir. 1923); People v. Ballard, 134
N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892); Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1861).
The unanimity rule arose from the common law view that the relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the corporation was contractual. Since a major transac-
tion involving corporate assets would affect the contract and property rights of every
shareholder (including even the smallest minority) the rule held that only a unani-
mous vote could protect the rights of all. Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (1853). See
generally Kremer v. Public Drug Co., 41 S.D. 365, 170 N.W. 571 (1919); Gibson, How
Fixed are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 L. & CONTsMP. PROB. 283 (1958).
7. "Neither the directors nor a majority of the stockholders have power to sell all
the corporate property as against the dissent of a single stockholder, unless the corpo-
ration is in a failing condition." 3 COOK ON CORPORATIONS § 670 (7th Ed. 1913). See
also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Treadwell v. Salis-
bury Mfg. Co., 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 393 (1856).
8. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941)(citing S.E.C.
Report on the Work of the Protective and Reorganization Committees, Part VII 557,
590).
9. Voeller v. Nielston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941). See generally
Gibson, How Fixed are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 L. & CoNTzau. PROB. 283
(1958).
Many states have reduced the requirement still further to a simple majority of the
vote. For a comparison of state statutes regarding shareholder approval, see 2 MODEL
1981]
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A merger occurs when one or more corporations are ab-
sorbed into another already-existing corporation (the "surviv-
ing" corporation) which retains its name and corporate iden-
tity along with the added capital, franchise, and powers of the
former constituent corporation (the "acquired" corporation). 10
When legislatures enacted statutes allowing mergers to be au-
thorized by majority vote, they were forced to provide some
remedy for dissenting minority shareholders. 1 The remedy
took the form of "appraisal" provisions which were incorpo-
rated into the merger statutes. Today's appraisal statutes pro-
vide dissenting shareholders with the right to sell their shares
back to the corporation (the "surviving" corporation) in re-
turn for a cash sum equal to the "fair market value" of the
shares.12 If an agreement cannot be reached on the value of
the shares, the appraisal statutes provide that a petition be
ified after which the courts will make the determination of
value.1
3
There are numerous disadvantages to the appraisal rem-
edy. First of all, the appraisal remedy can only pretend to
protect the value of the investment, not its form. In many
cases, establishing the fair market value of stock is time-con-
suming and expensive.' 4 Furthermore, the statutes themselves
raise the possibility of litigation when the parties cannot
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 73 1 3 & 6.
10. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 96 F.2d 655 (1938). See
generally 15 FLrECHFR CYc. CORP. § 7041 (1973 & Supp. 1979). For a listing and
comparison of merger procedures in state statutes, see 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.
2D § 71 11 3 & 6 (1971 & Supp. 1973).
11. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the individ-
ual against the deprivation of property without due process of law. Majority rule of
the corporate form would give the majority the right to alter or dispose of a dissent-
ing shareholder's property without his consent. It was clear that mergers affected
"the very essence of the stockholder's investment," but commercial pressures necessi-
tated majority rule. E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 29 (1973).
State legislators took steps to head off the possible unconstitutionality of major-
ity-vote merger statutes by incorporating appraisal provisions into the merger stat-
utes. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 246-47 (1962).
12. For a comparison and listing of statutes providing for the rights of dissenting
shareholders, see 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 81 i 3 & 6 (1971).
13. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 81 1 1 (1971).
14. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 234-35 (1962).
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agree.15 A particularly difficult problem with appraisals arises
in the case of closely-held corporations which lack both a
ready market and set standards for fixing the value of the
shares in dispute."l
A significant body of decisional law exists regarding the
fiduciary duties owed within the corporate form, particularly
as developed by the courts of equity.'7 The duties are owed by
management (directors and officers) and by controlling share-
holders to the corporation and to the minority shareholders.'8
However, since procedures such as mergers are authorized by
statute, redress for oppressed minorities has too often been
allowed only in transactions in which fraud or blatant over-
reaching could be proven.19 Thus, statutory compliance by the
majority or corporate management has served to frustrate mi-
nority redress in equity.20
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHORT-FORM MERGER
A. New York Origins
1. Statutory Development
Commercial demands for still more management flexibility
gave rise to a procedure for corporate mergers called the
short-form merger.2' Short-form merger statutes generally re-
quire the board of directors to vote on a plan containing, inter
alia, the terms of the merger in detail and the manner of
share conversion. 22 If such a plan is approved by board resolu-
tion, notice is sent to the shareholders, the plan is executed,
filed with the secretary of state of the corporation's domicile,
and the merger is complete. Shareholder votes and meetings,
which are required in the traditional or "long-form" statutory
merger, are deemed unnecessary because the short-form
15. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 81 1 (1971).
16. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 233 (1962).
17. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusiNEss EN-
TERPRISES, § 232 at 451 (1970).
18. Id. at § 231 at 450.
19. Id. at § 240 at 475.
20. See the defendant's argument in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 107-09, infra.
21. Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CH. L. REV. 596, 596 (1965).
22. For the model short-form merger statute after which many state statutes are
patterned, see 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 75 % 1 (1971).
1981]
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merger is considered the practical equivalent of a liquidation
of the subsidiary into the parent.23
The short-form merger apparently had its origin in New
York in 1924 when the legislature adopted a provision which
would allow a simple board resolution to authorize a merger
between a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary.24 The pro-
cedure was indeed comparable to a liquidation of the subsidi-
ary. This "short" form of merger avoided the time and ex-
pense of shareholder meetings and votes on a corporate action
which would not materially affect the individual shareholder's
interests. Obviously, when the subsidiary was wholly-owned,
there existed no dissenting minority of the subsidiary whose
rights and holdings would be jeopardized by the merger. This
first short-form merger law was thus a desirable statutory
shortcut which brought a certain economy to the merger pro-
cedure and had no adverse effects.
A drastic change in the concept of the short-form. merger
developed during the depression when "overleveraged" utility
empires found themselves on the verge of collapse.25 These
utilities, greatly in need of some method to simplify their
holding and operating company relationships, lobbied for a
provision which would allow a short-form merger even if the
subsidiary were less than "wholly-owned." '26 Subsequently, in
1936, the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Public
Utilities recommended to the New York Senate and Assembly
that the "wholly-owned" provision be changed to a 95% pro-
vision which would apply only to utilities27
The committee reported that "the consolidation of operat-
ing companies will tend to effectuate greater economies, more
efficient management and rate reductions."28 Furthermore,
the report showed evidence that "simplification of holding
and operating company relationships in the public utilities
field had been made difficult by the blocking tactics of small
23. For a comparison of short-form merger statutes, appraisal rights, and cash-
for-shares provisions, see 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 75 %1 3-6.
24. 1924 N.Y. LAWS CH. 441.
25. Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. Rav. 596, 602 (1965).
26. Id.




minority interests. '29 The committee report added, however, a
requirement that every such contemplated merger between
utilities receive prior approval by the Public Service Commis-
sion of New York.30 The conclusion drawn from the commit-
tee report was that "in 1935, and for years thereafter, there
was a nationwide demand for such simplification of the com-
plex intercorporate structures of public utilities, and it [was]
apparent that the 1936 and 1937 amendments [allowing a
merger with a 95%-owned subsidiary] were part of an effort
to meet that demand. 31
In 1936, the New York statute was thus amended, elimi-
nating the requirement that the subsidiary be wholly-owned
and authorizing a merger between a parent utility and its sub-
sidiary in which the parent owned a 95% or more interest.2
This 95% provision of the statute changed the character of
the short-form merger in a very significant way. For the first
time there existed a five percent minority of subsidiary share-
holders whose status and rights remained in question: How
was the 5% interest to be treated? Since the subsidiary's mi-
nority had no opportunity to vote on the merger, what was to
happen to their interest?
The 1936 New York Statutes provided for the five percent
minority interest in the following way:
[I]n case the possessor corporation shall not own all the out-
standing stock of the other corporation to be merged, the
resolution of the board of directors of the possessor corpora-
tion shall state the terms and conditions of the merger, in-
cluding the securities, cash or other consideration to be is-
sued, paid or delivered by the possessor corporation upon
surrender of each share of the merged corporation not
owned by the possessor corporation.3
The statutory language is clear: the minority interest in the
subsidiary could be eliminated by a board resolution and a




32. 1936 N.Y. LAWS CH. 778. In 1937 "domestic district steam corporations" were
added to the utilities allowed to use the short-form merger statute. 1937 N.Y. LAWS
CH. 815.
33. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw CH. 60 § 85(1) (Consol.) (1936 Supp.).
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nority need not be given an opportunity to participate in the
continuing enterprise. Thus, while the form of the minority's
investment goes unprotected, the legislature apparently con-
cluded that the value of the investment was sufficiently pro-
tected by the appraisal remedy. 4
However, the operation of the 95% provision still con-
tained important restrictions. The statute still applied only to
mergers of utilities and those mergers had to be authorized by
the Public Service Commission of New York.3 5 The statutes
directed the PSC "to make such investigations and/or hold
such public hearings as [were] in its opinion necessary or de-
sirable to enable it to determine if such approval should be
granted."3 6 Thus, even though the minority of the subsidiary
could not vote on the merger, they could make an appeal to
the PSC to deny authorization of the merger.3 7 A further re-
striction on the operation of the 95% provision was the re-
quirement that the subsidiary corporation be "engaged in bus-
iness similar to or incidental to the business which the
possessor corporation is authorized to engage in . . .. 3
These restrictions stood as checks upon the parent corpora-
tion's use of the short-form merger. As these statutes indicate,
at that time, it was necessary for the parent to show some
purpose for the merger sufficient to gain the approval of the
PSC.
2. Early Court Treatment in New York
The 95% statute was challenged in the courts and upheld
in Alpren v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York. 9 There,
34. The appraisal statute at that time was contained in N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW CH.
60 § 21 (Consol.)(1936 Supp.).
35. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW CH. 60 § 85(5) (Consol.)(1936 Supp.).
36. Id.
37. The 1936 New York Statutes provided that notice of a proposed merger be
mailed to each stockholder of the subsidiary corporation before the merger was filed
with the Secretary of State. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW CH. 60 § 85(1) (Consol.)(1936
Supp.). The statute also provided that the Public Service Commission's authorization
be obained before filing with the Secretary of State. Id. at § 85(5). When read to-
gether, the apparent legislative intent of those two sections was to give notice to
shareholders so that their dissent could be registered at the Commission's hearings,
before the merger was approved and before it was finalized with the Secretary of
State.
38. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW CH. 60 § 85(1) (Consol.)(1936 Supp.).
39. 168 Misc. 381, 5 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the 95% pro-
vision, alleging that the statute interfered with her vested
rights as the owner of stock in the merged corporation. The
court denied the plaintiff's action, however, and applied a ju-
dicial "hands-off' policy by holding that the short-form
merger was "primarily a matter of public policy within the
province of the legislature to control.' 40 Unfortunately, this
summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claims became the typical
judicial treatment on the theory that the legislature had not
shown any intent to give greater protection to the minorities.
For instance, in a subsequent challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the New York statute in Beloff v. Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York,41 the court was more explicit in its rejection
of the plaintiff's claim and in its characterization of the plain-
tiff minority shareholder's rights:
In short, the merged corporation's shareholder has only one
real right; to have the value of his holding protected, and
that protection is given him by his right to an appraisal, see
Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535, 61 S.
Ct. 376, 85 L.Ed. 322. He has no right to stay in the picture,
to go alone into the merger, or to share in its future benefits.
He has no constitutional right to deliberate, consult or vote
on the merger, to have prior notice thereof or prior opportu-
nity to object thereto. His disabilities in those respects are
the result of his status as a member of the minority, and any
cure therefor is to be prescribed by the Legislature, if it sees
fit. In none of this do we see any deprivation of due process,
or of contract rights.42
The court in Beloff returned to the legislative committee re-
ports to attempt to discern the legislative intent in enacting
the 95% provision.43 The court made reference to the legisla-
ture's concern that "blocking tactics of small minority inter-
ests" were hindering major corporate transactions. In making
this reference, the court endorsed the theory that minorities
must not be allowed to unfairly cripple majority decision-
40. Id. at 383, 5 N.Y.S.2d at 256. The Alpren case is often cited as an endorse-
ment of the judicial "hands-off" policy and judicial deference to legislative authority
in this area of the law.
41. 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
42. Id. at 19, 87 N.E.2d 564-65.
43. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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making."" But, it is clear from the court's decision and the au-
thority cited, that the elimination of the minority, while unde-
sirable, was meant by the legislature to be merely incidental
to a necessary corporate action, an incidental cost which was
incurred so that the entire enterprise could continue to func-
tion. In no way did the court view the legislature's intent as
condoning the use of the short-form merger procedure for the
purpose of eliminating the minority. But again, at the time
the Beloff case arose, the legislature had placed strict limita-
tions on the application of the short-form merger (it applied
only to utilities), and had required the utilities to obtain Pub-
lic Service Commission authorization.45
In 1949, the New York legislature removed two restrictions
on the short-form merger, thereby making the procedure
available to all stock corporations and removing the require-
ment that the merger receive prior agency approval.46 The
statute still required, however, that the subsidiary be "author-
ized to engage in business similar to or incidental to the busi-
ness which the possessor corporation is authorized to engage
in."'47 Eventually, this requirement was also eliminated when
the New York statutes were revised to follow the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act of 1960.48
As these checks on the operation of the statute were re-
moved, the short-form merger became a tool which manage-
ment could more freely wield to whatever end they desired.
The initial impetus and rationale for the short-form merger
(the simplification of corporate restructuring in the desperate
utility empires) became buried in the history of the statute.
The short-form merger as a management tool remained, ap-
plying to corporations generally in many states by 1960."9
44. The Beloff opinion at 87 N.E.2d 565 cites In re Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 181, 93
N.E. 522, 523 (1910) for the proposition that the minority must yield to the wishes of
the majority in order for the corporate form to function.
45. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
46. 1949 N.Y. LAWS CH. 762.
47. Id.
48. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905 (McKinney) (Legislative Studies and Reports) at
55.
49. Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 596, 602 (1965).
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B. Delaware and Beyond
Delaware modeled its short-form merger statute after that
of New York. 0 As originally enacted in 1937, Delaware re-
quired the subsidiary to be wholly-owned. 1 But in 1957, Dela-
ware went beyond even the New York statute and allowed a
short-form merger where the parent owned a 90% interest in
the subsidiary.2
The first test of the Delaware 90% short-form merger stat-
ute came in Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp.53 In
Coyne, the plaintiffs, four percent minority shareholders in
the subsidiary, questioned the parent's right to pay off the mi-
nority of the subsidiary in cash and thus eliminate without
choice the minority's property interest in the corporation. The
plaintiffs argued that the short-form merger statute was only
a procedural statute and that the substantive power for the
statute was conferred by the general merger statute, which did
not allow the payment of cash for stock surrendered in a
merger." The court held that the statute conferred both pro-
cedural and substantive powers, allowing the parent to pay off
the minority of the subsidiary in "securities, cash, or other
consideration . . ... In denying the plaintiff's claim, the
Coyne court cited Beloff as authority. 6
With an arsenal of case law to back up the constitutional-
ity of the statute, the short-form merger grew in popularity.
The 1960 Model Business Corporation Act offered the short-
50. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962).
51. 41 DEL. LAWS CH. 131 (1937).
52. 51 DEL. LAWS CH. 121 (1957). Prior to this amendment in 1957, three other
states (including New York) permitted short-form mergers where the parent owned
95% of the subsidiary: COLO. CORP. ACT § 71 (1958); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 85
(1949); TENN. GEN. CORP. LAW § 48-518 (1955).
53. 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959). For a critical analysis of the Coyne decision, see
Note, Elimination of Minority Share Interest by Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw. U.L.
REV. 629, 631 (1959).
54. 154 A.2d at 895.
55. Id. at 896. The Delaware statute under scrutiny in Coyne was almost identical
to the New York provision:
IT]he resolution ... shall state the terms and conditions of the merger, in-
cluding the securities, cash, or other consideration to be issued, paid, or deliv-
ered by the parent corporation upon surrender of each share of the merged
corporation not owned by the parent corporation.
Id. at 894.
56. Id. at 898.
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form merger as an optional section but endorsed the 95 % pro-
vision. However, when the Model Act was revised in 1971,
the drafters followed Delaware's lead and adopted the 90%
provision. 8 None of the statutes made any restrictions as to
the purpose of a proposed merger. The courts took their cue
from the legislative silence and made no inquiry into the pur-
poses of mergers under the statute.
The 1962 decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 58 is a landmark in the his-
tory of the short-form merger. Without basing its conclusion
on either legislative history or legislative intent, the court
boldly stated that "the very purpose of the short-form merger
statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of
eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enter-
prise." 60 Thus, according to Stauffer, the elimination of the
minority was the purpose of a short-form merger, not merely
incidental to such a merger effected for another purpose.
Stauffer's interpretation, however, flies in the face of the stat-
ute's history, distorting the original legislative intent and set-
ting the stage for the abuses which developed.
As construed by the Stauffer decision, the short-form
merger had become a "cash-out" procedure rather than a
merger statute."1 The statutes, so construed, clearly leaned in
favor of the parent corporation, conferring the power to
choose arbitrarily to eliminate the minority's property interest
in the enterprise by paying cash for the minority shares. The
57. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 68A 1 1 (1960). For a list of states' treatment
of the short-form merger, see 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 68A 1 2.01-6 (1960).
58. 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 75 1 (1971). Court decisions paralleled
this development. The New York court's treatment of the short-form merger in Al-
pren indicated their deference to the will of the legislature and their hesitance to
become involved in the complexities of corporate restructuring. See text accompany-
ing notes 39-40 supra. The early decisions treating short-form mergers were en-
couraged in their hands-off policy by arguments that legislatures "favor" mergers:
"The state has an interest in the corporate structures erected under its authority.
Having provided for the merger of corporations, they are not regarded with disfavor.
On the contrary, mergers are encouraged to the extent that they tend to conserve and
promote corporate interests." Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318,
334-35, 11 A.2d 331, 338 (1940). See also Note, Elimination of Minority Share Inter-
est by Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 629, 631 (1959).
59. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
60. 41 Del. Ch. 7, -, 187 A.2d at 80.




subsidiary's minority was left with no recourse in asserting
their property rights, and only an unpredictable appraisal
remedy to "assure" a "fair" cash-out price. A further disad-
vantage and long-ignored effect of the cash-out process was
the tax consequences which such a remedy had upon the elim-
inated minority after the merger was completed.6 2 The poten-
tially adverse tax consequences might be used as a threat to
coerce the minority shareholder into accepting securities
worth less than the fair value of his interest so that the tax
could be avoided. 3
American economic history played an important role in the
sudden popularity of the merger device among corporate man-
agement groups. The bull market of the late 1960's en-
couraged many privately-held corporations to go public.6 4 But,
the recession of the 1970's caused the value of the publicly-
held stock to plummet.6 5 In an effort to capitalize on the col-
lapse in the value of the stock 6 and at the same time rid
themselves of the headaches of public ownership, 7 corporate
62. When the minority interests are paid off in cash, securities or other property,
the individual minority shareholders will have to recognize gain on the transaction,
for tax purposes, to the extent that the fair market value of the cash, securities or
other property exceeds the shareholder's basis in the property. I.R.C. § 1001(a) & (c),
TREAS. REG. § 1.1001-1(a).
Although the minority shareholder's conversion of his stock into cash, securities or
property is, in fact, involuntary, it does not fall within any of the Internal Revenue
Code's non-recognition provisions which postpone recognition of gain. See I.R.C. §
1031(a) ("not including. . . stock") and I.R.C. § 1033 ("property destroyed in whole
or in part by theft, seizure, requisition or condemnation").
Fortunately, the minority shareholder will be entitled to treat these gains as long-
term capital gains if they qualify under I.R.C. §§ 1221-1223. This entitles a taxpayer
to a deduction for 60% of the net capital gain recognized on an item. I.R.C. § 1202(a).
This will, to some extent, mitigate the adverse tax consequences to minority share-
holders who have been forced out in a short-form merger.
63. Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. Rv. 596, 600 (1965). See
also F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.13 at 55 (Cumulative
Supp. 1979)(Supplementing p. 256 n.9 of the 1975 edition).
64. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 903 n.3 (1975). This article states that
between 1967 and 1972, some 3000 corporations filed registration statements with the
SEC for the first time (citing Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Re-
sponsibility, BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 278 at D-1 (Nov. 20, 1974)).
65. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
66. Id.
67. Public ownership necessarily includes compliance with the registration, filing
and numerous other requirements of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 77-78
(1976). For a review of the costs of public ownership, see Borden, Going Private-Old
Tort, New Tort or No Tort? 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 987, 1006-08 (1974). See also 46 GEO.
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insiders6 s looked for ways to reacquire all of their publicly-
held common stock and to return their enterprise to their own
private hands. Such a program aimed at share reacquisition is
known as "going-private."6 When the minority shareholders
are given cash or debt securities for their equity interests in-
stead of continued participation in the enterprise, this type of
"going-private" transaction is referred to as a "take-out," or
pejoratively termed a "freeze-out" or "squeeze-out. '7 0
The merger thus became a key management tool in ena-
bling a corporation to "go private." A classic going-private
freeze-out merger is accomplished when the majority stock-
holders of one corporation form a second corporation, over
which the majority has 100% ownership, then merge the origi-
nal corporation with the second corporation and pay off the
minority shareholders in cash. The minority shareholders are
thus removed from the surviving corporation.7 1 A contrived
and manipulable freeze-out procedure such as this was not
contemplated (nor would it have been condoned) by the New
York legislature which enacted the first short-form merger
statute.72 Indeed, freeze-outs go far beyond the legislative in-
tent" and thus represent an abuse of the statute. A plan
which charters a new corporation solely so that it may merge
with the existing corporation and eliminate the minority, per-
verts the original intent of the statute, yet remains within the
boundaries of the corporation laws.
But, is such minority elimination unfair? The going-pri-
vate mergers which only became frequent practice in the
1970's74 too often were grossly unfair.75 When the corporations
WASH. L. REv. 877 (1978).
68. By the term "insiders" it is meant the core group which directs the operation
of the corporation. Even when the corporations went public, the "insiders" retained
sufficient interest to maintain this "majority" status. For a discussion of insiders' mo-
tives and techniques in "going private," see Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903,
905-11 (1975).
69. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
70. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv.
987, 988-89 (1974).
71. 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 877, 879 n.29 (1978). This is precisely the procedure
utilized by the defendant in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977)
discussed infra.
72. See text accompanying notes 24-38 supra.
73. Id.
74. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 903-04, n.5 (1975).
75. Id. at 905. In a 1974 address, a commissioner of the SEC referred to going-
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went public in the 1960's, the public, in many cases, pur-
chased shares at very high prices.76 When the public was
"cashed out" in the 1970's, however, they received only a frac-
tion of the earlier price." The insiders determined the terms
offered to the public shareholders and thus enriched them-
selves at the direct expense of the investing public.78 In cases
in which the cash out price was higher than that which they
originally paid, the "cashed out" shareholders not only lost
their property rights, but incurred a capital gains tax as well.79
The use of the merger device in both its long 0 and short
forms for going-private freeze-outs became increasingly wide-
spread,"' but state laws and courts continuously failed to
check the abuse.82 Frustrated minorities finally sought refuge
in the federal courts under the authority of Securities and Ex-
change Rule 10b-583 which outlaws fraud and deceit in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities.
private transactions as "serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perversion of
the whole process of public financing, and a course that inevitably is going to make
the individual shareholder even more hostile to American corporate mores and the
securities markets than he already is . . . ." Address by Commissioner A. Sommer,
Jr., Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School, (Nov. 1974), reprinted
in 278 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), D-1, D-2 (1974), quoted in Note, 64 VA. L. REV.
1101, 1112.
76. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 905-06 (1975).
77. Id. at 905.
78. Id. at 906.
79. See notes 62 & 63 supra and accompanying text.
80. Inherent in the long-form merger is the right of all shareholders (of both
merging corporations) to meet and vote on such a major measure. See 2 MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 73 1 (1971). Hoivever, .many states now require only a simple
majority for authorization of the merger plan, including its conversion provisions. Id.
For a listing of state statutes regarding approval of shareholders, see Id. at 6.
Thus, a 51% majority could effect a freeze-out of a 49% minority even under a
long-form merger. The problems peculiar to the long-form merger are outside of the
scope of this article except as they relate to the problems of the short-form merger.
81. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 903-04, n.5 (1975).
82. The few reported cases in this area predominantly arose from appraisal dis-
putes. It would be impossible to determine how many complaints filed to attack a
short-form merger have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Statu-
tory compliance by the parent, coupled with judicial approval of parental power
would indeed seem to leave minorities with no cause of action and no willing ear. In
most cases, the defendant parent corporation moves to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Roland
Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). The section is entitled "Employment of Manipu-
lative and Deceptive Devices" and makes it:
1981]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
However, in 1977, the United States Supreme Court in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 4 narrowly construed Rule
10b-5 in a case involving a short-form merger, and found no
"deceptive" or "manipulative" conduct as required by the
Rule. The frustrated minorities were thus denied the refuge
they sought. The Santa Fe case sent back to the states these
corporate issues which had historically involved state regula-
tion, 5 and left it up to the states to fashion an appropriate
remedy for the minority in freeze-out situations."s
IV. THE NEW DELAwARE FORMULA
A. Singer and Tanzer: Long-Form Mergers
Shortly after Santa Fe Industries v. Green,87 the Delaware
Supreme Court handed down the leading case of Singer v.
Magnavox Co."s  Although Singer involved a long-form
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange...
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Indeed, in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), rehearing
en banc denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd 430 U.S. 462 (1977) and in Mar-
shel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 533
F.2d 1309 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S.
881 (1976), the Second Circuit did recognize and fashion a "justifiable business pur-
pose" requirement under S.E.C. Rule 10b-5 to protect minority shareholders. The
Green case, brought in the Southern District of New York, involved a short-form
merger. The Marshel case, brought in the same court, involved a long-form merger.
84. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
85. The Court expressed the fear that such "extention of the federal securities law
would overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporation law" in a wide vari-
ety of corporate areas. 430 U.S. at 479.
86. The Singer court saw the Santa Fe ruling as "a current confirmation by the
Supreme Court of the responsibility of a State to govern the internal affairs of corpo-
rate life." 380 A.2d at 976 n.6.
The Court in Santa Fe had concluded that " 'it is entirely appropriate in this
instance to relegate respondent and others in his situation to whatever remedy is
created by state law.'" 430 U.S. at 478 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
The Court stated further: "There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary
standards to govern mergers .... But those standards should not be supplied by
judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.'" 430
U.S. 479-80 (quoting Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflection Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974) (footnote omitted)).
87. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
88. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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merger, it nevertheless set the groundwork for later decisions
on the short-form merger statutes.
Singer v. Magnavox Co. involved a going-private freeze-
out merger which was utilized in the latter stages of a take-
over by a previously unrelated giant corporation. North Amer-
ican Philips Corporation, 9 (North American) sought to ac-
quire9 ° Magnavox Company.91 As part of their plan, North
American incorporated a "shell" corporation, North American
Development Corporation (Development), in order to make a
tender offer for the Magnavox common shares.2 Through the
tender offer, Development acquired 84.1 % of Magnavox's out-
standing stock.9 3 But, in order to eliminate the remaining
15.9% of public shareholders' interest and thus to acquire
100% of Magnavox's equity interest, North American had to
use a merger procedure.94 To that end, another "shell"
(T.M.C. Corporation) was created, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Development, for the purpose of merging with Magnavox."
Using the long-form merger procedure, shareholder meetings
and votes were held.' Of course, Development's 84.1% hold-
ing alone was enough to approve the merger.9 7 The action was
thus accomplished and the publicly-held stock was eliminated
in exchange for cash.98
The plaintiffs9 brought an action seeking an order nullify-
ing the merger as well as compensatory damages. 00 The alle-
gations were: (1) that the merger was fraudulent because it
served no business purpose other than the elimination of the
89. North American, a Delaware corporation, was the American subsidiary of
Philips, the Dutch electronics giant. 66 CAL. L. REv. 118, 125.
90. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. Supr. 1977).
91. Magnavox, a Delaware corporation, was engaged in the manufacture and sale
of consumer, defense and industrial products in the electronics field. Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1351 (Del. Ch. 1976).
92. Id. at 1351-52.
93. 380 A.2d at 971.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 972.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. The plaintiffs, Louis and Mollie Singer, were common stockholders of
Magnavox at the time of the merger. 367 A.2d at 1351. The Singers brought the ac-
tion on their own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all persons other than the
defendants who owned common stock on the day before the merger. Id.
100. 380 A.2d at 972.
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public minority; 0 1 (2) that in approving the merger at a cash
price per share which they knew to be grossly inadequate, de-
fendants 0 2 breached their fiduciary duties to the minority
shareholders;0 3 and (3) that the merger violated the antifraud
provisions of the Delaware Securities Law.' °4
In a thorough and carefully written decision, the Delaware
Supreme Court in Singer overturned most of the lower court's
decision 0 5 and focused on the "obligation owed by majority
shareholders in control of the corporate process to minority
shareholders, in the context of a merger. ... 106 The defen-
dants claimed that since they had fully complied with the
statutory procedures, the merger was unassailable.10 7 The
court drew from Delaware case law' 08 the proposition that "in-
equitable action does not become permissible simply because
it is legally possible."' 09 The court's analysis was thus based
on an application of the law governing corporate fiduciaries.
101. Id.
102. The defendants were Magnavox, North American Philips Corporation, North
American Philips Development Corporation and individual members of Magnavox
management. Id. at 971.
103. Id. at 972.
104. Id. The alleged violations were (1) the issuance, through proxy documents, of
false and misleading statements of material facts relating to the merger and (2) the
failure to disclose other material facts pertinent thereto. Id. at 980-81. The Chancery
Court concluded that this claim must fail because the proxy materials did not have a
significant enough impact upon the consummation of the merger. The Delaware Su-
preme Court upheld the dismissal on the above grounds and on the grounds that the
plaintiffs, Pennsylvania residents, did not have the proper standing to be covered by
the Delaware Securities Act. Id. at 981.
105. The Court of Chancery decision was reversed in part and affirmed in part.
380 A.2d at 970. The Court of Chancery had granted the motion to dismiss the entire
complaint, finding that (1) the merger was not fradulent merely because it was ac-
complished without any business purpose other than to eliminate the Magnavox mi-
nority shareholders; (2) dissatisfied shareholders, like the plaintiffs, have their rem-
edy in an appraisal; and (3) plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Delaware
Securities Act because the proxy materials did not have a significant impact on the
accomplishment of the merger. The issue of standing was not reached. Id. at 972.
106. Id. at 972.
107. Id. at 975.
108. The court cited Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439
(Del. 1971) and Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939) for
support.
109. 380 A.2d at 975 (quoting Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437,
439 (Del. Supr. 1971)). For a general review of the law of fiduciary duties as applied
to the corporate form, see H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BusiNEss ENTERPRISES § 240 (1970).
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Drawing again from case law, the court held that "corpo-
rate officers and directors, and controlling shareholders owe
their corporation and its minority shareholders a fiduciary ob-
ligation of honesty, loyalty, good faith and fairness,"11 since
the minority's property interests are under their control. The
opinion rested on essentially two principles of law:
First, it is within the responsibility of an equity court to
scrutinize a corporate act when it is alleged that its purpose
violates the fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders;
and second, those who control the corporate machinery owe
a fiduciary duty to the minority in exercise thereof over cor-
porate powers and property, and the use of such power to
perpetuate control is a violation of that duty.
By analogy, if not a fortiori, use of corporate power
solely to eliminate the minority is a violation of that duty."1
From these two fundamental principles, the court held that
the defendants had violated the fiduciary duties owed the mi-
nority and thus that the plaintiff minority's complaint did
state a cause of action for violation of fiduciary duty upon
which relief could be granted in equity. 12
The Singer court held that the elimination of the minority
was an improper purpose for a merger and was a violation of
the majority's fiduciary duty.1 3 However, the court left to an-
other day the question of what actually constitutes a proper
business purpose in the merger area. The court did hold that
courts were "duty bound"114 to closely examine any allega-
tions that the purpose for the merger was improper even if all
of the statutory requirements are met.115 The rule placed the
110. 380 A.2d at 977. See also Allied Chemical and Dye Corp. v. Steel and Tube
Co. of America, 120 A. 486 (Del. Ch. 1923).
111. 380 A.2d at 979-80.
112. Id. at 980. On April 3, 1981, the Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch v. Vick-
ers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981), held that rescission is the proper remedy
for a case involving a tender offer in which material facts had not been disclosed to
the minority shareholders. In Lynch, the court held that the appraisal method is im-
proper when determining damages in a fiduciary duty case, and rescission should be
used in order that the plaintiff stockholders be adequately compensated. While
Lynch did not involve a short-form merger, it did emphasize the law of fiduciaries in
the corporate form and thus may have an impact on the remedies available in short-
form merger cases.
113. Id. at 980 n.11.




burden of proving a proper business purpose on the defen-
dant, once the plaintiff has claimed that the purpose violates
a fiduciary duty.1 "
Furthermore, the court stated that even if a purpose other
than a freeze-out is found, "[T]he dominant corporation, as a
majority stockholder standing on both sides of a merger trans-
action, has 'the burden of establishing its entire fairness' to
the minority stockholders, sufficiently to 'pass the test of care-
ful scrutiny by the courts.' "111 This statement is highly signif-
icant as it places another burden of proof on the defendant:
proof of the transaction's "entire fairness."
Thus, the two prongs of the Singer test are: (1) inquiry
into purpose, to determine whether the sole purpose was to
"freeze out" a minority, or whether there was a business pur-
pose, and, if there was not, then (2) scrutiny for "entire fair-
ness." The decision makes clear that the test must be met
even if the merger is in statutory compliance, and thus stands
as judicial recognition of the inadequacy of the appraisal rem-
edy." The entire decision bears a striking contrast to the
treatment given minorities in such early cases as Beloff"9
which had held that the minority's only redress was provided
by statute in the form of an appraisal. 2 '
Singer was followed only one month later by Tanzer v. In-
ternational General Industries, Inc.121 which probed the
"business purpose" rule of Singer in a proceeding brought to
enjoin a long-form merger. 22 The Tanzer court recognized the
ambiguity of the Singer "business purpose" test by noting
that there are a number of competing parties and at least two
corporate bodies involved in a merger. Thus, the difficulty lies
in establishing just whose business and whose purpose should
116. Id. at 975.
117. Id. at 976.
118. Id. at 977.
119. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
121. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
122. Id. at 1123. In Tanzer, the parent corporation, International General Indus-
tries, Inc., (IGI), owned 81% of Kliklok Corporation. As part of the plan to eliminate
the 19% minority of Kliklok, IGI formed KLK Corporation (the "shell" corporation).
The appropriate statutory procedure was followed and KLK Corporation merged
with Kliklok, in a cash freeze-out of the 19% minority of Kliklok. The plaintiffs were
minority stockholders and the defendants were IGI and its directors. Id. at 1122.
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be probed under the first prong of Singer's test.
The lower court in Tanzer had found that "the principal
reason for the merger, and evidently the only reason for the
merger, [was] to facilitate long term debt financing by [the
parent corporation]." 123 The plaintiffs conceded that there
was support for this finding in the record, but grounded their
claim on the premise that a freeze-out merger designed solely
for the benefit of the parent was a violation of the fiduciary
duty so recently affirmed in Singer.124 The Delaware Supreme
Court relied heavily on the lower court's conclusion that the
parent corporation had a "legitimate and present and compel-
ling business reason ' 125 to be the sole owner of the subsidiary,
and that the parent was "not freezing out the minority just
for the purpose of freezing out the minority." '26
On the basis of the facts, the court allowed the merger and
held that while the business purpose must be "bona fide," the
parent "need not sacrifice its own interest in dealing with a
subsidiary. ' 127 But, the court cautioned against a "subter-
fuge"- the real purpose of which is to freeze out the minor-
ity.12s Furthermore, the case was remanded so that the parent
could show it had met the second test of Singer: the "entire
fairness" to the minority.1 29 Thus, even after the court has
found that a "bona fide" purpose for a merger exists, the mi-
nority of the subsidiary are still entitled to a judicial review of
the "entire fairness" of the transaction.
B. Kemp and Roland: Short-Form Mergers
The Singer and Tanzer rulings, which finally provided re-
dress for minority shareholders n long-form merger freeze-
outs, were first applied to short-form mergers by the Delaware
Court of Chancery in Kemp v. Angel,130 but were not given
123. Id. at 1124, (quoting the Chancellor's opinion).
124. Id. at 1125.




129. Id. at 1125.
130. 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). Plaintiffs in Kemp sought a preliminary injunc-
tion from the Court of Chancery preventing a short-form merger on the grounds that
the proposed merger was the "last step in a premeditated course" to fraudulently
eliminate the minority for grossly inadequate consideration. 381 A.2d at 241. The
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full consideration by the Delaware Supreme Court until Ro-
land International Corporation v. Najjar.'
In Roland, a 97.6% majority of the Roland Corporation
caused another corporation (Landro, a "shell" corporation) to
be chartered for the sole purpose of merging with Roland
under Delaware's short-form merger statute.13 2 Hence, the
stage was set for what the court later described as a "classic
'going private' transaction, with the majority having complete
control over the timing of the 'squeeze play' on the public
stockholders - a timing conceivably selected to favor the ma-
jority only, based upon the status of the market and the ele-
ments of an appraisal.""3 " While the clear purpose of this
merger was to eliminate the minority of Roland, the defen-
dants contended that under Stauffer a proper purpose is pre-
sumed in a short-form merger.134 The Delaware Supreme
Court, specifically overruling any inconsistent statements in
Stauffer, held that:
[T]he duty arises from long-standing principles of equity
and is superimposed on many -sections of the Corporation
Law .... Differences between [the long-form and short-
form statutes], in terminology or in procedure, do not alter
the duty which exists apart from the procedures permitted
by the Statutes .... [W]e find nothing magic about a 90%
ownership of outstanding shares which would eliminate the
fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority.... In
fact, the need to recognize and enforce such equitable prin-
ciples is probably greater when the size of the minority is
smaller13 5
court held that the fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority requires the
same careful scrutiny by the court in a short-form merger as it does in a long-form
merger (as earlier decided in Singer and Tanzer). The court in Kemp decided that
the case must go to trial where all of the evidence could be properly scrutinized.
131. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
132. Id. at 1033.
133. Id. at 1037.
134. The Stauffer case had held that the purpose of the short-form merger was
the elimination of the minority. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
135. 407 A.2d at 1036. The court continued:
To state it another way, the short cut to merger afforded by § 253 [Delaware's
short-form merger statute] may not be used to short-circuit the law of fiduci-
ary duty. [citation omitted] ... The duty of the majority is not diluted as
control is strengthened nor is the right of the minority determined by how
small it is. Thus the fiduciary obligation owed in the context of a merger, be it
long or short, is singular, and falls alike on those who control "at least 90% of
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This rule of fiduciary duty was thus held to apply to short-
form mergers just as clearly as it had applied to long-form
mergers in Singer and Tanzer. The conclusion was reached
despite language contained in Stauffer that the very purpose
of the short-form merger statute was to eliminate the minority
interest. The Roland court did much to return the short-form
merger procedure to the course originally intended for it by
the legislature: (1) it recognized the fiduciary duties owed to
the minority regardless of size; (2) it overruled the inconsis-
tent language in Stauffer regarding the short-form merger's
purpose; and (3) it recalled correctly that the statute's original
legislative purpose was to "simplify the steps necessary to ef-
fect a merger ... ."1'3 that is, while the elimination of the
minority may be incidental to such a merger, as in Singer, the
majority must establish that there was a proper purpose for
the transaction in the first instance. Roland expressly stated
what the Singer decision had only implied by placing the bur-
den of proving "proper purpose" and "entire fairness" on the
defendants. The court thus declared that the plaintiff's com-
plaint did indeed state a cause of action.'5 7
V. THE SINGER-ROLAND TESTS INTERPRETED
A. The "Business Purpose" Test
The Singer-Roland line of cases has created the following
two-prong test in cash-out merger cases: (1) the merger must
be shown to have a valid business purpose (a "bona fide" pur-
pose as Tanzer described it); and (2) the merger must survive
judicial scrutiny for "entire fairness."
The Singer Court did not invent the business purpose test,
but merely applied earlier Delaware law to the merger area.
Singer relied on the following quote from Bennett v. Breuil
Petroleum Corporation5 " in which the court had considered
the purpose of the majority's action: "As a starting point, it
the outstanding shares,".., and those who control a majority but less than
90% .... Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1037.
138. 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953). Bennett involved a plaintiff's attempt to
have a stock issuance cancelled despite the fact that the issuance met the statutory




must be conceded that action by majority stockholders having
as its primary purpose the 'freezing out' of a minority interest
is actionable without regard to the fairness of the price."' 9
The Singer court borrowed also from Schnell v. Chris-
Craft Industries, Inc. 140 Schnell provided the theory that
statutory compliance does not insulate a transaction from
court scrutiny.141 The court scrutiny in Schnell focused on the
business purpose of the proposed action, thereby providing
the precedent for the first prong of the Singer test. As to pur-
pose, the Schnell court concluded that management, in at-
tempting to use corporate machinery and Delaware law for
the purpose of perpetuating itself in office, was abusing the
corporate process.142 This abuse injured rights of the minority
for which Schnell allowed relief in equity.143 Thus, the busi-
ness purpose rule existed in prior Delaware case law, but it
was Singer which first applied it to the merger area.
The business purpose rule in Singer emerged from princi-
ples of equity, since the merger statutes are silent as to pur-
pose.144 Based, then, in equity, the rule provides courts with a
certain freedom of action which can be adapted to new cir-
cumstances. The Singer decision recognized the inherent flex-
ibility of the equitable principles by applying the same ap-
proach as an earlier Delaware case: "The occasions for the
determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are
many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formu-
lated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed
139. 99 A.2d at 239.
140. 285 A.2d 437 (DeL 1971).
141. Id. at 439. See text accompanying notes 108 & 109 supra.
142. Id. In Schnell, the managing directors were attempting to advance the date
of the annual shareholders' meeting allegedly to obstruct the efforts of dissenting
stockholders to undertake a proxy contest. The attempt met all of the statutory re-
quirements but the court nevertheless reviewed the circumstances (including the bus-
iness purpose for the action) and reversed the lower court's denial of a preliminary
injunction.
143. Id. at 439-40.
144. See, e.g., the Model Act sections on mergers: 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §
71 1 (the long-form merger section) & § 75 1 (the short-form merger section).
Indeed, the Singer court in applying the business purpose rule recognized the
statutory silence but noted that the trend in recent unreported Delaware cases had
been to require a showing of valid business purpose (citing Pennsylvania Mutual
Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter International, Inc., Del. Ch. C.A. 4845 (Aug. 5, 1975), and
Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., Del. Ch. C.A. 4945 (Dec. 23, 1975)).
380 A.2d at 975.
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scale. ' 14 5 One month after the test was announced, in Tanzer
v. International General Industries, Inc.,4" the Delaware Su-
preme Court itself acknowledged that the rule was
"ambiguous."14
At least one commentator has criticized the Singer court
for not distinguishing between the different types of take-out
mergers in fashioning the rule.14s However, the so-called "am-
biguity" of the business purpose rule was necessary to retain
court flexibility. The broad principles underpinning the rule
permit future courts to shape decisions according to all of the
circumstances surrounding the challenged merger.
A survey of some of the decisions which were handed down
in light of Singer and Roland provides some insight into the
application of the business purpose rule. In Kemp v. Angel, 4 9
the court looked at the corporation's history, paying special
attention to the majority's past treatment of the minority.
The Kemp facts reveal that the majority reached its superior
position by making continued stock offers and purchases over
the years. Finally when it reached 90.6% ownership, the ma-
jority used the short-form merger to cash-out the minority. 50
The court apparently viewed this background as supportive of
the allegation that the majority had a long-standing plan to
eliminate the minority15 ' for it granted a preliminary injunc-
tion preventing the merger.152
Likewise, in Young v. Valhi, Inc.,153 the court viewed the
majority's three attempts to gain total control as evidence of
145. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
146. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). See text accompanying notes 121-129 supra.
147. 379 A.2d at 1123.
148. See 64 VA. L. REV. 1101, 1110 in which it is further stated:
These mergers, however, serve different purposes: the merger may be intended
as the second step of an outside corporation's acquisition of a target corpora-
tion; it may reflect the classic 'going private' case,. . . ; or it may convey the
decision of a long-time public corporation to go private.
149. 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). See note 130 supra.
150. Id. at 242.
151. Id. at 241.
152. Id. at 245.
153. 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978). In Young, the majority holder of common
shares of Valid, Inc. was the defendant Contran Corporation, a holding company. The
plaintiffs, minority owners of stock in Valid, prayed for an injunction against the
merger between Contran, the parent-holding company and Valki. A permanent in-
junction was granted by the court.
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its goal to eliminate the minority in a long-form merger pro-
posal.' 5 Interestingly, the defendants in Young presented evi-
dence that the merger would serve two business purposes,
namely, tax savings and the avoidance of future conflicts of
interest.155 However, in rejecting the defendants' claims, the
court stated: "[H]aving tried the case, examined the exhibits
as well as the testimony of the witnesses and considered their
demeanor on the stand, I am of the opinion that the basic
purpose behind the merger now before the court is effectua-
tion of a long standing decision ... to eliminate the minority
shares... by whatever means as might be found to be worka-
ble."' " Tanzer had warned of majorities employing a "subter-
fuge 1 57 to circumvent their fiduciary duty, and in Young, the
court apparently found such a case. In fact, the court was so
convinced of the impropriety of the purpose that it found it
unnecessary to pass on the overall fairness of the merger, 58
(the second prong of Singer's test) before it entered a perma-
nent injunction.
The pre-eminence of the "business purpose" test later
came into question again: If no business purpose is found for a
merger save the elimination of the minority, need the court
reach the question of the "entire fairness" of the transaction?
It appears from the language of Singer, Tanzer and Roland
that the merger fails if no business purpose is found. 59 In
154. Id. at 1378. See also Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, What Constitutes a Valid
Purpose for a Merger?, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 852 (1978).
155. 382 A.2d at 1378.
156. Id.
157. See text accompanying notes 127 & 128 supra.
158. 382 A.2d at 1378.
159. Both Singer and Roland stated that the effectuation of a merger for the sole
purpose of eliminating the minority constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty (without
regard to the fairness of the price). Singer, 380 A.2d at 977; Roland, 407 A.2d at 1034-
35. Indeed, the court in Tanzer found a "bona fide" purpose for the merger, yet re-
manded the case for a review of "entire fairness." 379 A.2d at 1125. See text accom-
panying note 129 supra.
For commentators who agree with this reading of Singer, see Comment, Delaware
Chills Freeze-Outs: A Critical Brief of Singer v. The Magnavox Company and
Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 3 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 426, 450 (1978);
Rothschild, Cash Mergers: A Current View, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 708, 711 (1979); Ter-
rell, Planning a Cash Merger After Singer, 4 Dnt.. J. CoRP. L. 720, 720 (1979); Brud-




fact, in a 1980 case, Coleman v. Taub,16 0 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware so held.161 Thus, the busi-
ness purpose rule has emerged as the dominant element of the
Singer-Roland analysis.
Other cases which have dealt with the question of a
"proper purpose" have varied greatly in both factual and legal
contexts. 62 Judicial interpretations of a business purpose
have been as varied as those of legal commentators, ranging
from a required showing of "compelling corporate need"163 to
a mere showing of lower operating costs.1" As earlier stated,6 5
the Tanzer court held that a merger to facilitate long-term
debt financing by a majority stockholder could be regarded as
a "bona fide" purpose.
Economies of production and scale, reduced operating and
accounting costs, and the elimination of duplicative depart-
ments and functions may all be proper purposes for a merger,
but the court will undoubtedly weigh the evidence presented
in light of the surviving corporation's total financial and struc-
tural picture in a search for the true purpose. The ever-pre-
sent specter of court scrutiny for the merger's true purpose
should serve as a check on corporate management and protect
many minority shareholders from freeze-out type abuses.
B. The "Entire Fairness" Test
Establishing a business purpose is the first prong of the
Singer-Roland test, but as the Tanzer decision showed, the
surviving corporation must also demonstrate the "entire fair-
ness" of the transaction. The "entire fairness" test was bor-
rowed from Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,166 a 1952 case
160. 487 F. Supp. 118 (D. Del. 1980). The Coleman case was a derivative action
challenging a short-form merger.
161. Compare, Coleman v. Taub, supra note 160 with Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc.,
409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979) which appears to inextricably join the issue of business
purpose with the issue of fairness. Coleman did not regard Weinberger as controlling.
162. For a thorough discussion of cases involving the construction of the "business
purpose" rule, both before and after Singer and Tanzer, see Terrell & Ranney-Mari-
nelli, What Constitutes a Valid Purpose for a Merger?, 51 TmP. L.Q. 852 (1978).
163. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 931 (1975).
164. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.
1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975), cited in Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, What
Constitutes a Valid Purpose for a Merger?, 51 TEmp. L.Q. 852, 871 (1978).
165. See text accompanying notes 123-26 supra.
166. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
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in which the Delaware court, recognizing the potential for
abuses in mergers between parent corporations and their
dominated subsidiaries, placed the burden on the parent to
establish the "entire fairness" of the transaction sufficient to
"pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts. 1 117
Although the Sterling case involved the fairness of the
price of the stocks,168 the Singer-Roland cases were not so re-
stricted. The full scope of the "fairness" inquiry remains to be
developed by the courts, but there are some indications by
cases which have addressed the issue. Of course, Singer stated
that "entire fairness" would be carefully scrutinized since the
parent stands "on both sides of a merger transaction. '"1 19 But
it was the concurring opinion in Singer which gave sugges-
tions as to the scope of the inquiry: "To determine whether
the burden has been met under Sterling, I think the Court
must scrutinize the business purpose, or economic necessity,
desirability and feasibility involved, evidence of self-serving,
manipulation, or overreaching, and all other relevant factors
of intrinsic fairness or unfairness. 1' 7 0 These suggestions are
also quite broad but nevertheless do give some insight into the
courts' line of inquiry.
The Tanzer decision makes it clear that the inquiry into
"entire fairness" was meant to probe more than just price
fairness,171 and incorporates some of the suggestions of the
Singer concurring opinion. One commentator has stated that
"unless courts limit the entire fairness test to price fairness, it
will be too broad and uncertain.117 2 But this view would un-
necessarily restrict the courts' ability to deal with the chang-
ing problems in merger situations. Again, the beauty of equi-
table principles lies in their flexibility in adapting to new
circumstances and needs.
167. Id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110.
168. Id. at 298-311, 93 A.2d at 109-16.
169. 380 A.2d at 976.
170. 380 A.2d at 982 (McNeilly, J., concurring).
171. 379 A.2d at 1125. The Delaware Supreme Court in Tanzer termed as "too
restrictive" the chancellor's opinion which "discussed fairness only in terms of the
price offered.for the stock." Id.




The Delaware cases provide a much needed formula for
giving redress to oppressed minority rights by weighing all of
the aspects of the merger transaction and granting relief on
the basis of traditional equity concepts. The courts are the
proper fora for a full consideration of testimony adduced as
well as other evidence offered before reaching a determination
on the fairness of the transaction. 17 The abuses of the present
corporate law regarding mergers have gone unchecked for far
too long. It is time for the courts of every state in which such
abuses have gone unchallenged to adopt the Delaware formula
and give redress in equity for minority rights.
The role of the courts must not be to bind the hands of all
corporate management, but rather to serve as a necessary
check on the abuses of some. This role can be properly main-
tained by the use of equitable principles which can be
adapted over time to the changing needs of the law, the corpo-
ration, and the public.
CATHERINE L. CURRAN
173. An alternative approach has been adopted in California to give a forum for
oppressed minorities in the merger area. Under Cal. Corp. Code §§ 1101(e) and 1101.1
(West), which became effective January 1, 1978, either all of the shareholders must
consent to a cash squeeze-out merger or the California Commisioner of Corporations
(or one of the other named government officials) must determine that the terms and
conditions of the cash squeeze-out merger are fair, just and equitable. The Commis-
sioner will give great weight to the collective judgment of the minority. F. O'NEAL,
OPPRESSION OF MINORrrY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.13 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (Supplementing p.
256 n.9 of the 1975 edition).
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